Purpose -This paper investigates as to whether post-Apartheid South African (SA) listed corporations voluntarily comply with and disclose recommended good corporate governance (CG) practices and, if so, the major factors that influence such voluntary CG disclosure behaviour. Findings -Our results suggest that while compliance with, and disclosure of, good CG practices varies substantially among the sampled companies, CG standards have generally improved over the five-year period examined. We also find that block ownership is negatively associated with voluntary CG disclosure, while board size, audit firm size, cross-listing, the presence of a CG committee, government ownership and institutional ownership are positively related to voluntary CG disclosure.
Introduction
Recent decades have witnessed a proliferating interest in corporate governance (CG) (Collett and Hrasky, 2005; Filatotchev and Boyd, 2009) , following well-publicised cases of major corporate scandals and failures in developed countries, which were attributed mainly to poor CG practices (Cadbury Report, 1992; Deutsche Bank, 2002) .
Interest in CG was particularly heightened by the 1997/1998 Asian economic crisis, which demonstrated that macro-economic difficulties could be worsened by systematic CG failures in developing countries (King Report, 2002; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006) , resulting in a relative explosion globally in the issuance of codes of good CG that generally seek to improve the way in which corporations are governed by encouraging greater transparency, accountability and responsibility (Cadbury Report, 1992; King Report, 2002; Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009; Cicon et al., 2010) .
However, the ability of CG codes to achieve good governance depends on the extent to which companies are willing to engage in effective voluntary compliance and disclosure (Core, 2001; Healy and Palepu, 2001) . Despite the increasing number of CG codes in developing countries (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009 ), existing studies examining the levels of compliance with CG codes are disproportionately concentrated in a few developed countries (Conyon, 1994; Conyon and Mallin, 1997; Pellens et al., 2001; Bebenroth, 2005; Cromme, 2005; Werder et al., 2005; MacNeil and Li, 2006; Pass, 2006; Hegazy and Hegazy, 2010) . Arguably, in developing countries with different institutional settings and CG structures (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009; West, 2009), voluntary compliance with CG codes can be expected to differ from what has been reported in developed countries. Thus, an examination of voluntary CG disclosures in developing countries, where there is limited empirical evidence, is crucial in providing a more complete understanding of corporate voluntary compliance and disclosure behaviour.
In this paper, we examine voluntary CG disclosures in South Africa (SA). In line with global developments, SA has experienced significant CG reforms, which can be specifically dated back to the collapse of Apartheid in 1994. In fact, SA was the first developing country to introduce a code of good governance in the form of the 1994 and 2002 King Reports (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009 ). As will be discussed further, and distinct from those of other Anglo-American countries, the King Reports explicitly require firms to go beyond the financial and regulatory aspects of CG by taking into account the interests of a wide range of stakeholders, such as local communities, employees and customers (King Report, 2002; West, 2009 ). Similar to other AngloAmerican countries, the King Reports adopt a UK-style 'comply or explain' compliance and disclosure regime. However, critical concerns (Kakabadse and Korac-Kakabadse, 2002; Andreasson, 2010) have been raised as to whether a voluntary compliance and disclosure regime can be effective in improving governance practices, given the nature of its corporate context. Briefly, the post-Apartheid SA corporate setting is uniquely characterised by concentrated ownership, weak enforcement of corporate regulations, high levels of institutional ownership and weaker shareholder activism, as well as distinctive features relating to the greater need to meet affirmative action and stakeholder CG provisions, such as black economic empowerment and with regard to HIV/Aids (Bar et al., 1995; Armstrong et al., 2006; Ntim, 2009 ). In particular, concentrated ownership renders the market for corporate control weak (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006) , which can impact negatively on the willingness of corporations to engage in voluntary compliance and disclosure, and thereby limits the ability of a voluntary code to improve CG standards.
Despite the relative uniqueness of the SA context and the voluntary nature of the King Reports, there is a clear dearth of empirical studies analysing the level of compliance achieved (Okeahalam, 2004; Mangena and Chamisa, 2008) . For example, the Institute of International Finance (IIF) 2007 Report assessing CG implementation and practices in emerging markets indicates that while SA appears to have a sound and welldeveloped CG framework in the form of the King Code, no study has been done to ascertain the actual levels of compliance among listed firms. Specifically, the IIF Report on SA states that "… to date, no study has been conducted to assess the level of compliance with corporate governance-related requirements among listed companies or to verify the reasons for non-compliance" (IIF, 2007, p. 1).
However, there are a limited number of prior cross-country disclosure studies whose samples include a number of SA listed firms that need to be acknowledged. Firer and Meth (1986) Stock Exchange (NYSE), including 4 SA firms to, investigate the level of compliance with three mandatory disclosure requirements on their websites: disclosure on the differences between NYSE CG rules and national ones, information on the audit committee, and the disclosure of the audit committee charter. The findings of the study indicate that there is a gap between the minimum NYSE's disclosure requirements for foreign firms and what is actually disclosed on the websites in relation to CG disclosure.
The current study differs from existing ones in a number of ways. First, while our study seeks to specifically examine the levels of compliance with recent CG disclosure policy reforms in the form of the 2002 King Report among SA listed firms, existing ones are either general international comparison disclosure (in the case of Firer and Smith 1986) or CG disclosure (in the case of Patel et al. 2002 and Khan 2009 ) studies, which are differently focused. Second, and apart from differences in focus, the samples used by existing cross-country studies are discernibly smaller in comparison to the size of the current sample, which arguably limits the generalisation of their findings for SA listed firms. Finally, our study investigates voluntary CG disclosures over the 2002 to 2006 period, which is more recent compared with the periods examined by existing crosscountry studies and therefore, the current investigation can also be considered as an extension to prior studies.
Given this background, the main purpose of this paper is to investigate whether and to what extent post-Apartheid SA listed corporations voluntarily comply with and disclose recommended good practices and, if so, the major SA context-specific, as well as general factors influencing such voluntary CG disclosure behaviour. In doing so, we make a number of distinct contributions to the extant literature. First, using CG data extracted directly from annual reports, we provide for the first time detailed evidence on the level of compliance with the 2002 King Report (King II) by constructing a broad CG compliance and disclosure index containing 50 CG provisions using a sample of 169 SA listed corporations from 2002 to 2006. Distinctively, but in line with the CG provisions of King II, our broad compliance and disclosure index includes conventional CG mechanisms, such as those relating to board and directors, as well as SA context-specific affirmative action and stakeholder provisions. Second, we provide evidence on the main factors driving the level of voluntary compliance and disclosure of good CG practices among SA listed corporations. This can improve our understanding of the major factors that influence the level of voluntary compliance and disclosure of CG practices in a major developing country in which various stakeholders, such as the government, the Institute of Directors and the Johannesburg Securities Exchange (JSE) Ltd take a keen interest in CG, affirmative action and stakeholder issues.
Our analysis of the factors influencing voluntary CG compliance and disclosure suggests that ownership and other CG variables are generally significant in explaining variations in voluntary CG disclosure. Specifically, our results suggest that an increase in block ownership significantly reduces voluntary CG disclosure, implying substitutability between block ownership and CG disclosure, as a managerial monitoring mechanism. In contrast, we find that companies with larger boards, a big-four auditor, higher government ownership, a CG committee and higher institutional ownership, disclose considerably more; an indication that these variables are complementary to voluntary CG disclosure. Our results are generally robust to whether we use a weighted or an unweighted index of CG disclosure and whether or not we control for firm fixed-effects.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section provides an overview of the institutional framework of CG in South Africa. The following sections review the prior literature and hypotheses development, describe the data and research methodology, and report empirical and robustness results, while the conclusion contains a summary and a brief discussion of policy implications.
The institutional framework for corporate governance in South Africa
Corporate governance in SA was formally institutionalised by the publication of the first King Report (King I) in 1994 (Armstrong et al., 2006; West, 2009) introduced. Domestically, and most importantly, under the new neo-liberal economic policy of encouraging growth, employment and redistribution (GEAR strategy), the ruling ANC passed a number of affirmative action and stakeholder laws on black economic empowerment and HIV/Aids (see Section 4 of the Appendix). These were aimed at addressing historical socio-economic racial inequalities and needed to be incorporated into the governance of mainstream SA corporations. As a consequence, a major distinguishing feature of King II, compared with other Anglo-American CG Codes, is that it adopted the 'inclusive' approach (West, 2009; Andreasson, 2010) to compliance, that maintains and strengthens the Anglo-American (shareholding) features (see Sections 1 to 3 of the Appendix), while also incorporating substantial SA context-specific affirmative action and stakeholder demands (stakeholding). While these features make the South African CG model a hybrid and unique among other Anglo-American countries (West, 2009; Andreasson, 2010) , critical concerns have been expressed as to whether, given the uniqueness of the SA corporate setting, a voluntary compliance and disclosure regime like King II can be effective in raising CG standards in SA. As such, we seek to empirically examine the level of compliance with King II, as well as investigate the major factors influencing voluntary compliance and disclosure of good CG practices among post-Apartheid SA listed corporations.
Prior literature and hypotheses development
Prior literature (Cooke, 1992; Owusu-Ansah, 1998; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Patel et al., 2002; Collett and Hrasky, 2005; Cheng and Courtenay, 2006) has identified a number of variables that can influence corporate disclosure. We draw from this literature, as well as the SA corporate setting, to identify factors that are likely to influence the level of voluntary compliance and disclosure of good CG practices. Specifically, we examine ownership structure variables, including block, government and institutional ownerships, as well as other CG variables, namely board size, cross-listing, audit firm size and the presence of a CG committee. As previously explained, these variables, especially block ownerships by large companies and government, are pervasive in SA and therefore considered to be specific to the SA corporate context.
Ownership structure variables
Greater managerial monitoring and lesser information asymmetry associated with block ownership can be expected to reduce agency costs and improve firm value (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) , and thus a reduced need for corporate disclosure. By contrast, diffused ownership requires greater monitoring, which can be reduced through increased corporate disclosure (Enk and Mak, 2003) . Consistent with the results of Patel et al. (2002) for a cross-country sample of 354 firms from 19 emerging markets, including 12 non-financial SA listed firms, Barako et al. (2006) report a negative association between block ownership and voluntary disclosure for a sample of 43 Kenyan listed firms, while Mangena and Chamisa (2008) find that incidences of listing suspension in a sample of 81 SA firms is higher in corporations with greater block ownership. Corporate ownership in SA has historically been dominated by a small set of very large companies built around highly complicated cross-holdings and tall pyramids (Barr et al., 1995; Okeahalam, 2004) and, as such, block ownership is more likely to influence voluntary CG disclosure. Therefore, our first hypothesis is that:
H1: There is a statistically significant negative association between block ownership and the level of voluntary compliance and disclosure of good CG practices.
Due to their larger ownership stakes, institutional shareholders have extra motivation to monitor corporate disclosure and thus, more information will be voluntarily disclosed by managers to meet the expectations of large institutional shareholders (Barako et al., 2006) . Haniffa and Cooke (2002) and Barako et al. (2006) report a positive association between institutional ownership and corporate disclosure in samples of 167 Malaysian and 43 Kenyan listed firms, respectively. Within the SA context, institutional ownership is likely to be a relevant driver of corporate disclosure because the use of pyramidical structures means that institutional ownership is intrinsically pervasive (Barr et al., 1995; Okeahalam, 2004) . King II also encourages greater activism by institutional shareholders to improve CG and disclosure practices in SA firms and, thus, our second hypothesis is that:
H2: There is a statistically significant positive association between institutional ownership and the level of voluntary compliance and disclosure of good CG practices.
Corporations with greater government ownership can have access to resources, such as finance and contracts that can increase performance (Malherbe and Segal, 2003; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006) . However, associated political interference and conflict of interests between shareholders and government will require greater levels of corporate disclosure (Eng and Mak, 2003) . The empirical literature relating to the association between government ownership and corporate disclosure is limited, although Eng and Mak (2003) report that government ownership impacts positively on voluntary disclosure.
The SA government holds significant ownership stakes in large public and private corporations through the Public Investment Commission (PIC) with keen interest in CG, affirmative action and stakeholder issues and, hence, our third hypothesis is that:
H3: There is a statistically significant positive association between government ownership and the level of voluntary compliance and disclosure of good CG practices.
Other corporate governance variables
Greater managerial monitoring power associated with larger boards can impact positively on disclosure and performance (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006) . By contrast, Jensen (1993) argues that larger boards are associated with poor communication and monitoring, which can have a negative effect on disclosure and performance. Ho and Williams (2003) report no link between board size and performance in a sample of 84 SA corporations, while Mangena and Chamisa (2008) indicate that board size has no impact on incidences of listing suspensions using a sample of 81 SA firms. King II does not specify the exact number of directors that should form a board, but sets out a general principle that every board must consider whether its size makes it effective, indicating that it considers board size as an important CG mechanism. Given the mixed theoretical and empirical literature, however, our fourth hypothesis is that:
H4: There is a statistically significant association between board size and the level of voluntary compliance and disclosure of good CG practices.
Previous studies (Meek et al., 1995; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002) suggest that corporations that cross-list on foreign stock markets tend to have better CG and disclosures practices, as they are subjected to additional accounting, governance and disclosure requirements. Meek et al. (1995) and Collett and Hrasky (2005) Audit firm size has been suggested to have a positive influence on corporate disclosure (Owusu-Ansah, 1998; Eng and Mak, 2003) and audit quality (DeAngelo, 1981) . This is because larger audit firms have greater financial strength, experience, expertise, information and knowledge (DeAngelo, 1981; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002) , which improves their independence and ability to limit opportunistic activities of managers, and a number of studies have reported a positive association between audit firm size and corporate disclosure (Owusu-Ansah, 1998; Eng and Mak, 2003) . Also, King II recognises external auditors as one of the key stakeholders in ensuring that SA firms voluntarily comply with its CG provisions. Therefore, our sixth hypothesis is that:
H6: There is a statistically significant positive association between audit firm size and the level of voluntary compliance and disclosure of good CG practices.
King II does not require SA corporations to establish CG committees to continuously monitor compliance with its CG requirements. However, it is expected that companies that voluntarily set up CG committees to specifically monitor their compliance are more likely to engage in good CG practices and disclose more than those that do not have CG committees (Core, 2001; Ntim, 2009 Table I contains a summary of the sample selection procedure. Panel A of Table I contains the industrial composition of all nonfinancial companies that were listed on the JSE, while Panel B of Table I contains the final sampled companies with full data.
Insert Table I about here The CG disclosures were extracted from the sampled companies' annual reports collected from the Perfect Information Database, while the accounting variables were obtained from DataStream. We set two criteria for company selection in our final sample: the availability of a company's full five-year annual reports from 2002 to 2006 inclusive and the availability of a firm's corresponding accounting data for the same period. The criteria were set for several reasons. First, and following prior studies (Eng and Mak, 2003; Barako et al., 2006; Henry, 2008) , the criteria helped in meeting the requirements for a balanced panel data analysis. Gujarati (2003) suggests that there are advantages for using panel data, involving both cross-sectional and time-series observations, more degrees of freedom and less muliti-collinearity among variables. Second, examination of five-year data with both cross-sectional and time-series properties may help in determining whether the observed cross-sectional link between voluntary CG disclosure and its drivers also holds over time. Table I , the full data required is obtained for a total of 169 out of the 291 companies [2] for the five firm-years and 8 industries in our analysis.
Research methodology: definition of variables and model specification
Fundamental to our analysis is the construction of a general index, SACGDI, which is employed as a voluntary CG compliance and disclosure index. The SACGDI contains 50 CG provisions based on the five broad sections of King II covering: (1) boards, directors and ownership, (2) accounting and auditing, (3) risk management, internal audit and control, (4) integrated sustainability reporting, and (5) compliance and enforcement. The detailed provisions are contained in the Appendix. The SACGDI is constructed by awarding a value of '1' if any of the 50 CG provisions of King II is disclosed in an annual report and zero otherwise [3] . With this scheme, a company's total disclosure score in a particular firm-year can vary between zero (0%) to fifty (100%), with higher index levels indicating better compliance and disclosure.
Even though this simple dichotomous weighting scheme may be unable to capture the relative significance of the various CG provisions (Marston and Shrives, 1991; Beattie et al., 2004; Barako et al., 2006) , we adopt it for a number of reasons. First, given the lack of a rigorously developed theoretical framework on which weights could be correctly assigned to different CG provisions, using an unweighted coding scheme avoids a situation whereby our disclosure index is excessively biased towards a particular set of CG provisions (Marston and Shrives, 1991; Botosan, 1997; Owusu-Ansah, 1998) . Second, the findings of prior studies indicate that the use of weighted and unweighted indices tend to give similar results (Owusu-Ansah, 1998; Barako et al., 2006) . Finally, dichotomously scoring disclosures in annual reports is supported by a rigorously established theoretical and empirical literature (Marston and Shrives, 1991; Meek et al., 1995; Collett and Hrasky, 2005; Beattie and Thomson, 2007; Tsamenyi et al., 2007; Henry, 2008) .
To reduce potential omitted variables bias, we include a number of control variables, as detailed below. Unlike the ownership and CG proxies, these variables are common across different studies and, as such, considered to be a general test of the determinants of voluntary CG disclosures. Table II presents summary definitions of all variables employed, including the dependent (SACGDI), independent (specific) and control (general) variables.
Insert Table II about here Due to greater agency problems (Jensen and Meckling, 1976 ) and higher political costs (Meek et al., 1995; Tsamenyi et al., 2007) , larger firms can be expected to voluntarily disclose more. Similarly, highly geared firms can be anticipated to disclose more to assure their creditors of the likelihood of honouring their debts (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002) , while firms with higher investment and growth opportunities have greater need for external funds and, thus, can be expected to engage in higher disclosure to reduce information asymmetry (Eng and Mak, 2003; Collett and Hrasky, 2005) . Further, managers of profitable companies may disclose more to justify higher compensation (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Barako et al., 2006) and, as such, we expect firm size (LNTA), gearing (GEAR), profitability (ROA), growth (GROWTH), and capital expenditure (CAPEX) to relate positively to the SACGDI. Finally, following prior research (Cooke, 1992; Barako et al., 2006; Henry, 2008) , we predict that the SACGDI will vary across different industries and financial years and, thus, we introduce year (2002 to 2006) and industry dummies for the five remaining industries [4] . Assuming that all relationships are linear, our main OLS regression equation to be estimated is specified as: We discuss the empirical results, including descriptive statistics and regression analyses in the following section.
Empirical results

Empirical results: descriptive statistics and univariate regression analysis
Summary descriptive statistics of all variables included in our analysis are contained in Table III . All the variables generally exhibit wide spreads. For example, block ownership ranges from a minimum of 10% to a maximum of 92% with a mean of 62% [5] . Consistent with the findings of previous studies (Deutsche Bank, 2002; Ho and Williams, 2003) , board size is between 4 and 18 with a median of 10 board members. The figures for audit firm size, cross-listing, government and institutional ownerships, as well as the control variables indicate substantial variation in our sample, hence minimising possibilities of sample selection bias. Crucially, there is also substantial degree of dispersion in the distribution of the SACGDI, ranging from a minimum of 6% (3 out of 50
items disclosed) to a maximum of 98% (49 out of 50) with the average company complying with 61% of the 50 CG provisions examined.
Insert Table III about here To examine the levels of improvement in compliance, as well as ascertaining the CG provisions that contribute most to the degree of variation observed in the aggregate levels of compliance with the SACGDI, we investigate the levels of compliance among the sampled companies with the individual CG provisions that constitute the SACGDI. Table IV reports the percentage levels of compliance with the CG provisions for the pooled sample, as well as for each of the five firm-years. Row 3 of Table IV reports aggregate levels of compliance, while Row 4 does similarly for the individual CG provisions.
Consistent with the results of past studies (Patel et al., 2002; Barako et al., 2006; Henry, 2008) , the findings in Row 3 indicate that compliance with the CG provisions generally improves over time, with the aggregate compliance levels increasing from 47% For eight (16%) provisions, such as the disclosure of company risks, compliance levels are comparatively high, with 90% or more of the sampled companies complying with these provisions. By contrast, for 11 (22%) provisions, such as having an independent board chairperson, compliance levels are relatively low, with 40% or less of the sampled firms complying with these provisions. For the 29 remaining provisions, compliance levels are intermediate, ranging between 46% and 86%. Overall, the main evidence that emerges from examining the full sample of companies is that despite the expectation that the introduction of King II would speed-up convergence of CG standards (Malherbe and Segal, 2003; Armstrong et al., 2006) Spearman's non-parametric coefficients are reported and, noticeably, the magnitude and direction of both coefficients are very similar, suggesting that no serious non-normality problems exist. Both indicate further that correlations among the variables are fairly low, implying that there are no major multicollinearity problems. We additionally examined (for brevity not reported here, but available on request) scatter plots for P-P and Q-Q, studentised residuals, Cook's distances and Durbin-Watson statistics for homoscedasticity, linearity, normality and autocorrelation, respectively, with the tests indicating no serious violation of these OLS assumptions.
Insert Table V about here   Table V suggests statistically significant links between the SACGDI and the explanatory variables, and also between the SACGDI and the control variables.
Consistent with our predictions, audit firm size, board size, cross-listing, government ownership and institutional ownership are significantly and positively related to the SACGDI, while block ownership is significantly and negatively associated with the SACGDI. With respect to the control (general) variables, the results indicate that larger and profitable firms disclose significantly more, as hypothesised. However, evidence that firms with higher investment and gearing disclose significantly less, as well as evidence of no significant link between growth firms and voluntary CG disclosure, is not consistent with our hypotheses. (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) . This also supports H1 and the results of previous studies, which suggest that block ownership impacts negatively on disclosure (Patel et al., 2002; Barako et al., 2006; Mangena and Chamsia, 2008) , but is inconsistent with the findings of those that report a positive link between block ownership and disclosure (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Eng and Mak, 2003; Tsamenyi et al., 2007) .
Empirical results: OLS (multivariate) regression analysis
The coefficients on government ownership, institutional ownership, audit firm size, board size, the presence of a CG committee and cross-listing are positive and significant, at least at the 10% level, indicating that H2 to H7 are supported. The positive association between government ownership and voluntary CG disclosure is consistent with the findings of Eng and Mak (2003) , as well as the broader objectives of government investments. Through the PIC, the SA government holds significant ownership stakes in major corporations with keen interest in positively influencing CG, affirmative action and stakeholder issues. Evidence that cross-listed firms engage in higher disclosure provides support to the findings of past studies (Deutsche Bank, 2002; Collett and Hrasky, 2005) , as well as the view that cross-listed firms will invariably be expected to disclose more due to the additional CG and disclosure requirements that they have to comply with. The significant positive relationship between board size and voluntary CG disclosure rejects the findings of Ho and Williams (2003) and Mangena and Chamisa (2008) , while evidence that audit firm size impacts positively on disclosure is consistent with the results of previous studies (Owusu-Ansah, 1998; Eng and Mak, 2003; Tsamenyi et al., 2007) .
Insert Table VI about here Generally, the coefficients on the control (general) variables in columns 3 and 4
of Table VI exhibit the hypothesised signs. For example, and consistent with the findings of previous studies (Cooke, 1989; 1992; Meek et al., 1995) , firm size and profitability are significant and positively related to voluntary CG disclosure. In line with the results of previous studies (Barako et al., 2006; Henry, 2008) , voluntary CG disclosure significantly differs across different industries and years, and noticeably, disclosure is significantly less in 2002 and basic materials, but significantly more in consumers services (highest significant coefficient) and 2006 compared with the other years and industries, respectively. However, the negative and insignificant coefficients on capital expenditure and growth, as well as the insignificant coefficient on gearing again reject our hypotheses, but provide support for the results of Eng and Mak (2003) and Haniffa and Cooke (2002) who find no link between these variables and voluntary disclosure.
Robustness analyses
We conduct additional analyses to examine the robustness of our results. As previously explained, all 50 provisions constituting the SACGDI are equally weighted, but the number of provisions varies across the five sections, resulting in different weights being assigned to each section: board, directors, and ownership (54%); accounting and auditing (12%); risk management, internal audit and control (10%); integrated sustainability reporting (18%); and compliance and enforcement (6%). To check whether our findings are sensitive to the weighting of the five sections, we construct an alternative SACGDI, defined as Weighted-SACGDI, in which each section is awarded equal weight of 20%. Our results presented in columns 5 and 6 of Table VI differ slightly in that government ownership and the presence of a CG committee are now insignificant, but the general conclusions remain unaltered.
Additionally, variations in the opportunities and difficulties that corporations encounter differ over time, implying that voluntary CG disclosure behaviour may be jointly determined by unobserved firm-level characteristics (Henry, 2008) , which simple OLS regression may fail to identify. Hence, given the panel nature of our dataset, we estimate a fixed-effects model to control for possible unobserved firm-specific heterogeneity. This involves re-estimating equation (1), with the introduction of 168 dummies to represent the 169 sampled firms. Our fixed-effects results contained in columns 7 and 8 of Table VI remain essentially unchanged, suggesting that our results are not sensitive to potential unobserved firm-specific heterogeneity.
Summary and conclusion
South Africa (SA) has pursued close to two decades of corporate governance ( First, analysis of the levels of compliance with the constructed voluntary compliance and disclosure index generally indicates that, despite the expectation that the introduction of King II would speed-up convergence of CG standards, CG practices among SA listed corporations still vary substantially. At the aggregate levels, the scores range from a minimum of 6% to a maximum of 98% with the average sampled company complying with 61% of the 50 CG provisions analysed, as well as the mean CG score increasing from 47% in 2002 to 69% in 2006. While this is consistent with the variation in compliance levels reported by past studies, it demonstrates that a high degree of heterogeneity exists when it comes to the importance that SA listed companies attach to CG. However, despite concerns as to whether a voluntary CG regime will be effective given the uniqueness of the SA corporate context, the scores suggest that compliance levels and CG standards among the sampled companies have generally improved over the five-year period examined.
Second, our analysis of the SA context-specific factors driving voluntary compliance and disclosure suggests that ownership characteristics and other CG variables are generally significant in explaining variations in disclosure. Specifically, our results
indicate that an increase in block ownership significantly reduces voluntary CG disclosure, implying substitutability between block ownership and CG disclosure, as a managerial monitoring mechanism. In contrast, we find that companies with a larger board size, higher government ownership, higher institutional ownership, a big-four auditor and a CG committee, disclose significantly more; an indication that these variables are complementary to voluntary CG disclosure. With respect to the general factors, the results show that larger and profitable companies, as well as firms in the consumer services sector, disclose more. CG disclosure scores are also significantly higher in 2006 than in 2002. However, we do not find any evidence that highly geared and high growth firms disclose significantly more or less than their counterparts. Our results are generally robust whether we use a weighted or an unweighted index and whether or not we control for firm-level fixed-effects.
Third, our findings have important implications for policy-makers and regulators.
Evidence of increasing compliance with King II implies that efforts by various stakeholders, notably the SA Institute of Directors and the JSE Ltd, at improving CG standards in SA companies have had some positive effect on CG practices of SA firms.
However, the substantial variation in the levels of compliance with important provisions, such as having an independent board chairperson, suggests that enforcement may need to be strengthened further. In this regard, setting up a 'compliance and enforcement committee' to continuously monitor compliance levels among listed companies may be a step in the right direction.
Finally, while our findings are important and robust, some caveats are considered appropriate. We employ a dichotomous scheme which considers every CG disclosure as equally important. Whilst results based on our unweighted and weighted indices are generally the same, future studies may improve their analysis by constructing weighted and un-weighted CG disclosure indices. Also, due to data limitations, our analysis is restricted to seven factors that can influence voluntary CG disclosure. As data availability improves, future studies may need to investigate how other potential determinants, such as foreign ownership and the number of analysts, affect voluntary CG disclosure.
Notes
1. As the regulatory framework and capital structure of financials and utilities differ from nonfinancials, as well as following past research (Owusu-Ansah, 1998; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002) , these industries, with a total of 111 listed companies, were excluded, leaving eight industries and 291 listed corporations to be sampled. 2. As Panel B of Table I indicates, for 94 of the remaining 122 companies, two or more years' accounting data and annual reports were not available in the DataStream/Perfect Information Database. For the other 28 companies, both accounting data and annual reports were missing. 3. Since ordinal coding is appropriate when measuring corporate disclosures in which reasonable differences in the degree of disclosures can be expected (Marston and Shrives, 1991; Botosan, 1997; Beattie et al., 2004; Beattie and Thomson, 2007) , we adopt binary coding. As can be seen from the Appendix, with the exception of the nine provisions contained in the integrated sustainability reporting section (Section 4 of the Appendix), where some level of judgement is involved, the remaining provisions involve a straightforward present ('1') or absent ('0') disclosures. For example, the board chairperson is either independent ('1') or not ('0'), a firm has split the positions of chairperson and CEO ('1') or not ('0'), and so on. This leaves limited avenues to qualitatively discriminate among disclosure levels, such as meaningfully differentiating between firms that provide a quantification of the information disclosed or not, and thus using ordinal coding is inappropriate. With respect to the integrated sustainability reporting provisions, a firm only receives a value of '1' if its narratives are explicit as to the specific steps taken and the results achieved during a financial year as recommended by King II. All other disclosures, including those that seek to explain why a firm has been unable to comply with a particular provision in its annual report receive a value of '0'. 4. For lack of sufficient number of observations in three industries, namely health care, oil & gas, and telecommunications industries with three, one and three listed firms, respectively, observations from these industries were merged with the closest remaining five major industries. As a result (see Panel B of Table I ), the three health care firms were added to the consumer services industry, the one oil & gas firm was included in the basic materials industry, while the three telecommunications companies were included in the technology firms. 5. To minimise the effects of outliers, we winsorise all the variables at the conventional 1% and 99% levels. However, the whole regression analysis was first run with the outliers included, and the results were essentially the same. The main rationale for winsorising is to minimise potentially serious violations of the OLS assumptions. 6. To make sure that the residuals of a given firm may not be correlated across different years (timeseries dependence) or firms (cross-sectional dependence) within our five-year panel (Gujarati, 2003) , and following Pertersen (2009) Ratio of operating profit (wc01250) to total assets (wc02999). CAPEX (%) Ratio of total capital expenditure (wc04601) to total assets (wc02999).
GEAR (%)
Ratio of total debt (wc03255) to market value (mv) of equity. GROWT (%) Current year's sales (wc01001) minus last year's sales to last year's sales. INDUSTRY Dummies for each of the 5 main industries: basic material + oil gas; consumer goods, consumer services + health care; industrials; and technology + telecommunications firms. LNTA Natural log of total assets (wc02999 
